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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
NOTES
THE DEFENSE OF AUTOMOBILE COLLISION CASES
BY INSURERS IN PENNSYLVANIA
By
CHARLES L. CASPER*
Since the passage of the Pennsylvania "Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibil-
ity Act" 1 many motorists in Pennsylvania have obtained and are carrying public
liability and property damage insurance. It sometimes happens that a collision
will occur between two vehicles, the operators of each of which are insured
by the same insurance company. If litigation ensues as a result of such ac-
cident, may the insurance company, through counsel of its choice, defend either
or both of the operators?
In the California case of O'Morrow v. Borad2 this situation arose. Borad
brought an action for damages caused by a collision against O'Morrow, and
O'Morrow filed a cross-complaint against Borad. O'Morrow then brought a
suit for declaratory relief to obtain a determination as to the rights of the
respective parties under their insurance contracts insofar as the provisions re-
lating to the defense of claims were concerned, and whether he had the right
to defend the action through attorneys of his own choice. The California Su-
preme Court held it is contrary to public policy for one person (the insurance
company) to control both sides of litigation, and therefore the assureds were
excused from compliance with the cooperation clauses of their respective pol-
icies, and that the insurance company would be liable not only for the pay-
ment of any judgments obtained in the actions between the insureds together
with costs, but also for the fees of the parties' individual attorneys, such fees
being recoverable in lieu of the defense required by the insurance contracts. It
is submitted that the decision in this case promulgates an anomalous, unjust and
undesirable rule, and if this situation arose in Pennsylvania, this rule should
not be followed.
The California court argues that the issues of negligence and contributory
negligence in the action could not be separated. Since these issues require the
presentation of evidence by the same witnesses, although the insurance com-
pany proposed to retain different counsel for each policyholder, through these
respective attorneys the insurance company would have access to all informa-
tion in regard to the entire case. It is submitted that this is not a valid reason
to support the result of this case. The modern theory of litigation is that it
* Ph. B., Yale University; LL. B. Harvard School of Law; Member of the Luzerne County Bar.
Author of PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY LAW AND PROCEDURE (Geo. T. Bisel Co., 1943).
1 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1277.1 - 1277.39 Purdon (1945).
2 27 Cal. 2d 815, 167 P. 2d 483, 163 A. L. R. 894 (1946).
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is not a game and contest of wits, but rather that its object is to discover the
truth and to do justice.8
Modern procedural rules provide broad methods of discovery,4 and it is
rare today that the parties do not have access to all information in regard to
the case in advance of trial.
The court also argued that since under the terms of the policy contracts,
the insurer undertook .to pay any judgment rendered against either of the
parties, the company has a pecuniary interest in effecting a balance between the lit-
igants, and in so conducting the litigation that neither party recovers against the oth-
er. It is submitted that this reason does not support the court's conclusion. If the
parties were represented by counsel of their own choice rather than counsel
chosen by the insurer, each party could and probably would maintain that the
collision was due to the negligence of the other. If the collision occurred in
Pennsylvania and both parties were in fact negligent, neither could recover.
The difficulty, if any exists, could easily be solved by, instead of having cross
actions by means of counterclaim, having each action tried separately, in which
case each of the parties as plaintiff would be represented by counsel of his own
choice, while as defendant he would be represented by counsel chosen by the
insurance company, particularly since the only duty on the insurer is to defend
actions brought against the insured, not to bring action in his behalf. In any
event, it would only be just and proper for the insurance company since it must
pay any judgment obtained against its assured to the limit of liability provided
by the insurance contract, to control the conduct of the defense of the litigation
in which any such judgment may be rendered.
In Pennsylvania, the terms of the standard policy of liability insurance
expressly entrust to the insurer, the entire management of the defense of any
action against the insured, and the decision of whether to settle or try the case
is absolutely committed to it, and if it refuses to make a settlement for less than
the judgment finally recovered, it is ndt liable to the assured.5 But this does not
mean that the insurer can conduct the defense arbitrarily or capriciously with
impunity. The relationship of the insurer and insured required the highest degree
of good faith in the conduct of the defense.6 When the company, to protect
itself from liability, assumes the defense of an action to the entire exclusion
of the defendant of record, it should be held to a strict rule of good faith in
conducting the defense, and when, in its own interest, it deprives the defendant
of a substantial advantage in the course of a trial, it should be held liable for
8 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495 (1947); DeSimone v. City of Philadelphia, 78 Pa. D. & C.
483 (1951); Lower Merion Twp. v. Hobson Jr., 79 Pa. D. & C. 385 (1952).
4 FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37; PA. R. Civ. P. 4001-4025.
5 Schmidt v. Travelers Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 286, 90 At. 653 (1914); McClung v. Pennsylvania
Taximotor Cab. Co., 25 Pa. Dist. 583 (C. P. No. 2, Phila. 1916). See also: Indemnity Ins. Co.
v. Eazor, 71 Pa. D. & C. 626 (C. P. Allegheny 1950).
6 Weiner v. Targon, 100 Pa. Super. 278 (1930).
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the damages naturally resulting thereby. 7 And in Perkoski v. Wilson,8 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court said:
"When the company voluntarily undertook the defense of Wil-
son, in pursuance of its privilege under the policy, it assumed a position
of trust and confidence which called for an exercise of the utmost good
faith, particularly in view of the possible conflict of interest between
the insurer and the insured such as later developed. It was accordingly
incumbent upon the company to inform its policyholder of its pro-
spective adverse interest . .. ."
In Karp v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (No. 2), 9 it appeared that there
was a collision between an automobile owned by Delmonte and one owned
by Karp. Delmonte commenced an action of trespass against Karp and there-
after Karp started suit in trespass against Delmonte. At the time of the collis-
ion Karp carried an automobile indemnity policy with defendants, who under-
took the defense of Karp in the action brought against him by Delmonte. Sub-
sequently, without notice to Karp, his insurer's counsel settled Delmonte's suit
against Karp in such a way as to bar Karp's claim against Delmonte. Karp
thereupon brought an action of trespass against his insurers, alleging that were
it not for the negligent manner in which defendants settled the Delmonte claim,
Karp would have a valid cause of action against Delmonte for damages and
injuries sustained as a result of the accident. Preliminary objections were filed
to the complaint, but the Court held that the complaint stated a good cause
of action, on the proposition that in conducting a defense, it is the duty of
the insurer to act in a careful and prudent manner, giving the insured its un-
divided support; otherwise, it is liable for resulting damages, even though such
damages exceed the amount limited in the policy.
It is probable that the situation which arose in the O'Morrow case will
some day come before the appellate courts of Pennsylvania. In such event, it
is submitted that the rationale and rule of that decision should not be followed.
The rule which should be followed would be to permit the insurer to select
separate counsel for each assured and to require the cooperation of each as-
sured. The insurer will be under the strict duty of exercising the utmost good
faith towards each assured, and to inform each assured of the insurer's pro-
spective adverse interest, in which case each assured would be entitled, at his
own and not at the insurer's expense, to retain his own counsel who would be
required to cooperate with counsel selected by the insurer. Should the insurer
fail to exercise the good faith required or perform its duties in a negligent man-
ner, it would be liable to its assured, for such negligence, even though the
damages should exceed the limitations of liability contained in the policy con-
tract.
7 N. Y. C. R. R. Co. v. Mass. Bonding Co., 184 N. Y. Supp. 243 (cited with approval in
Weiner v. Targon, supra).
8 371 Pa. 553, 92 A. 2d 189 (1952).
9 83 Pa. D. & C. 566 (1952).
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SHOULD WE HAVE MANDATORY SEARCHERS OF LITIGANTS?
Within a period of less than two years, two courtrooms in Pennsylvania
have been the scenes of unprecedented acts of anarchy. On both occasions, an
irate litigant has assumed the role of the assassin in an effort to administer an
individual form of "justice". The costs of these attempts have been appalling-
the lives of a judge and an attorney, the wounding of other principals in the
proceeding.
Responding to the call of necessity, the House of Representatives on August
29, 1955 proposed House Bill 1748 in order to prevent future recurrences. It
says:
"Any person who is a party to a judicial proceeding shall submit
himself to a search for any deadly weapons before entering a court-
room. Failure to submit to the search shall bar the person from entrance
into the courtroom."
With the passage of this act still pending, this writer has attempted to
evaluate its probable effect in response to a very definite controversy presently
existing within the legal profession. The following presentation includes ar-
guments both for and against its enactment, as well as possible alternative so-
lutions. It must be noted, however, that any possible constitutional issue is be-
yond the scope of this note.
For
It goes without saying that some affirmative action must be taken to pro-
tect those who exercise their sacred right to litigate; the fear of murder should
be the least of a person's worries when he is innocently reaching out for the aid
of the judicial system. Likewise, it is readily agreed that the officers of the
court-both bench and bar-should not be subjected to the peril of bodily in-
jury merely because they have dedicated their lives to a community of orderly
and decent government.
It cannot be disputed that House Bill 1748 will attain these desired ob-
jectives if it is properly and conscientiously administered. Further discussion of
its intended effectiveness is obviously unnecessary.
Against
Although the argument in favor of this legislation can be disposed of
quickly because of its apparent necessity, the problems and adverse attitudes at-
tendant upon its enactment are both many and material.
The most basic argument against such a procedure is the impracticability
of its administration. With political policies as they are, such a requirement
would be a substantial incentive to increase courtroom personnel. This would ob-
viously be unnecessary, but it is still a possibility when you consider the mul-
titude of political appointees who occupy the four corners of the courtroom at
the present time. Also, the time and trouble involved is a material factor. With
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standard court schedules calling for a morning and afternoon session and sev-
eral recesses in the course of each, it is obvious that a thorough search each
time would greatly reduce the efficiency of our already congested court schedules.
Another argument advanced by many prominent jurists is that to require
a mandatory search in all types of litigation would result in lowering the dig-
nity of the court and the litigants-a result which no one desires. A moment's
reflection will reveal the embarrassment and disgust which would accompany
the usual "frisking" in attempting to locate deadly weapons through physical
contact. It is plausible to predict that this could result in the type of harm which
the bill is seeking to prevent. Of course, it can always be argued that electronic
devices, i.e. x-ray or electric eyes, could do the job as well if not better. But
with county budgets already bursting at their seams, it appears unlikely that
such machines could be installed and maintained. Even if some other means were
employed, the problem of mental injury is still to be encountered. A person in-
nocently prosecuting or defending a perfectly innocuous matter is unlikely to
allow his personal integrity to be questioned without feeling some loss of dig-
nity. This is not to be sanctioned!
Closely associated with the matter of dignity is the further contention that
such an embarrassing procedure is likely to have an adverse effect upon the at-
titude of the parties to their own problems and to the possibility of a fair ad-
judication by the court. This is especially true where the contest is one in which
there are already super-charged emotions prior to the actual trial or hearing.
In such a case, it is entirely possible that the search procedure could add the
final touch to complete irrationality and thus impede the correct presentation
of the parties' views on the case at bar. It must also be pointed out that if a person
is lawfully concealing a weapon and has no intention to use it for purposes of
violence, the act would still apply. The danger here is that the judge or jury
may be influenced by such a discovery and thus render a decision tinted with
prejudice. It seems grossly unfair to open the door to this possibility, although
a mathematically slight one, through an act which makes no provisions for
exceptional yet lawful and reasonable situations.
The argument has also been raised that a mandatory search would give
undue prominence to a situation which might be regarded as an occupational
hazard of anybody in high office. This may very well be true in the case of
judges and government prosecutors since they may be said to have impliedly
consented to be subjected to the criticisms and ill-feelings of their electors.
This contention, however, does not follow in the cases of private lawyers and
litigants; these persons surely have not intended to assume the risk of injury
upon entering the courtroom. Still, this argument against the bill is reasonable
provided there is a substitute method to relieve the threat of peril for those
who do not wish to accept its consequences.
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As a final argument against the bill it must be realized that although a
search, if properly conducted, would relieve all probabilities of assassination in
the courtroom, it would in no way prevent the possibility of retaliation outside
the court. It is more likely that the person bent upon accomplishing some vio-
lence would attempt it in a situation where he is less likely to be apprehended.
This contention has been substantiated by at least one case in Pennsylvania. Be-
sides, a procedure calling attention to the possibility of violence may prompt
those duller yet more violent personalities to try something which they other-
wise would not have thought to do or at least would not have attempted in a
public courtroom.
Alternative Solutions
In the above presentation, we have seen the need envisaged by the framers
of the bill as well as the objections attendant upon its enactment. No conclusion
may be made as to its merits or detriments without first considering other pos-
sible means for accomplishing the desired end. No doubt the reader has al-
ready formulated some alternate methods. The following is a discussion of
a few solutions which this writer believes to be the most valuable, but note that
he does not purport to exhaust all the possibilities.
One method which has been used with flawless success concerns the role
of the judge as an interpreter of the decision which he renders. Here, if the
judge with the cooperation of counsel explains an unpalatable order objec-
tively to those upon whom it is imposed, the emotional impact will be lessened
considerably. This, of course, will not remove the feeling of wrong or hurt
on the part of the person receiving the order, but it will go a long way to pre-
vent any violence. It will cause the cooling-off period to be greatly accelerated,
thus tending to stay even the out-of-court recourse to physical injury. If this
method, as well as any of the following suggestions, should not appear to be
immediately effective, a 24-hour lock-up would do wonders in curing a stub-
born party.
Since the two previously mentioned headline cases have occurred in non-
support proceedings, a procedure especially adapted for domestic relations cases
may be suggested. In these situations, the probation officer or other court official
conducts a pre-trial examination of the parties, investigating backgrounds, pres-
ent conditions and other relevant factors. On the basis of this investigation, he
makes an effort to effect a reconciliation, thereby causing the cooling-off per-
iod to have an early beginning. If the reconciliation is accomplished the mat-
ter is ended; if not, the case is brought to trial. The important thing in the
latter situation is that the parties enter court with the attitude, so to speak, of
having agreed to disagree. This feeling coupled with the usual informal at-
mosphere of a non-public hearing practically insures rationality and negatives
the probability of violent demonstrations.
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A third method of prevention, independent of a statute, is one which is
both practical and recommended for any type of proceeding. It merely calls
for the anticipation of situations in which overheated emotions might result
in displays of temper or violence, and then taking adequate precautionary meas-
ures. The experienced judge should be able to foresee such situations, and he
is certainly armed with the necessary instruments of prevention. The tipstaff,
that illusive character of debatable origin, could undoubtedly fulfill this pre-
ventative element if his duty of maintaining decorum were strictly enforced.
Also, the numerous deputy sheriffs found around the courthouse could be mo-
bilized for this purpose. The very presence of efficient courtroom personnel
would go a long way in deterring any outbreaks of violence.
Finally, it may be suggested that the existing Penal Code be re-evaluated
with a thought given to increasing the present penalties, especially those con-
cerned with concealing deadly weapons. It is true that such an action would
only indirectly affect the matter under consideration, but it still might re-
duce the already slight possibility of future recurrences.
Whatever the sentiment may be as regards House Bill 1748, the above
alternatives may be assumed to be effective. Several of them are combinations
of time-tested procedures currently being used in a few courts in Pennsylvania.
The unblemished records for peaceful litigation of those courts which antic-
ipated and provided for such possibilities silently but forcefully testify to the
effectiveness of the method employed.
Conclusion
Having considered the pros and cons of House Bill 1748 and in view of
the possible substitutional remedies, it is submitted that the benefits to be
derived from it are outweighed by its disadvantages. Any of the suggested al-
ternative methods would make such an act unnecessary and would still insure peace-
ful courtroom litigation.
RICHARD C. SNELBAKER
